The Uncompleted De-colonization Process of the Former Trust Territory of British Cameroons
By Mola Njoh Litumbe
Extracts from British Declassified Documents on the Southern Cameroons
“In particular we must be very careful about independence and temporary sovereignty lest N. Cameroon is likely influenced not to join Nigeria. This I believe is the overriding consideration. So we must be more or less tough with Foncha that joining his Cameroun Republic does not allow sovereignty for a term (sic) of years and then a Federation.”
“Any idea of a prolonged period of continued Trusteeship or of separate independent existence of the Southern Cameroons must be ruled out. This should be made clear at an early date to Foncha.”
“First of all I take it that objections hitherto seen to establishment of a separate Southern Cameroons State remain as strong as ever …. I am therefore assuming in what follows that our policy remains strongly against such a solution.”
“If Southern Cameroons political parties did combine to take action envisaged in paragraph 2 of telegram under reference, this would place us in a very embarrassing position. With support of moderate Afro-Asians and others, we have always argued that separate independence would produce an entirely unviable State. We have supported a unanimous resolution prescribing plebiscite which involves choice between Nigeria and Cameroun Republic.”
“I think it is important that we should not allow this matter to slide, as may happen if we are not sufficiently firm with Foncha – and perhaps also with Field – about the “third question” movement. I believe a firm attitude on this now may save us a great deal of trouble later and I think that H.M.G’s position should be made abundantly clear to Foncha in an effort to scotch tendencies towards the third question.”
“Can one argue that the terms of the question “Do you wish to attain independence by joining the Republic?” allow for an interim period during which the Southern Cameroons will virtually have its own separate and independent existence while the terms of reunification with the Republic are being worked out? The words “by joining the Republic” taken literally appear to rule this out. But it may be that Foncha will seek to argue that if his solution, having been agreed to by Ahidjo, is not opposed by the U.K., the U.N. may be induced to wear it. There would be the better grounds for this if Endeley were prepared also to agree to this interpretation of the question. We do not like all this at all. But we like the alternatives even less. To go for complete independence or to seek to insert a third choice in the plebiscite would create major difficulties.”
“What would worry me is if a sequel to the Southern Cameroons try for independence was the Northern Cameroons went the same way. That would really I think upset our relationship with Nigeria as a whole and for a long time to come, and that is something which we must at all costs avoid. The Southern Cameroons and its inhabitants are undoubtedly expendable in relation to this.”
